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Abstract 
Individuals sometimes prefer to anonymously donate money when they can publicly do so. In 
other words, they deliberately hide their costly prosocial behavior from a broad audience. 
While existing research has collated various evolutionary theories emphasizing the value of 
public prosocial behavior, it has not endeavored to address the preference for anonymous 
giving. The article discussed potential explanations for the preference and pointed to the 
importance of further scholarly discussion about the value and function of anonymous 
prosocial behavior.   
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Preference for Anonymous Giving 
When Donald Trump became the president of the United States in 2017, he pledged to build a 
wall on the border between the United States and Mexico. In December 2018, an Iraq war 
veteran launched a crowdfunding campaign, aiming to fund the border wall project. Since 
then, a number of people have donated, and more than 25 million U.S. dollars have been 
gathered. It is not surprising since several studies documented the prevalence of charitable 
giving in various contexts (e.g., Blackbaud, 2015; Engel, 2011; Soetevent, 2005). In fact, the 
prevalence of such other-regarding behavior has been well explained by various evolutionary 
theoretical frameworks (for reviews, see Barclay, 2012; Van Vugt et al., 2012; Wu et al., 
2016a). In addition, previous studies revealed that individuals direct costly prosocial acts 
more towards in-group members, compared to out-group members in various contexts (for 
reviews, see Balliet et al., 2014; De Dreu et al., 2014; Everett et al., 2015). Past research also 
documented in-group favoritism when contexts were politically charged (e.g., Balliet et al., 
2018; Rand et al., 2009). Thus, assuming that donors are mostly conservatives, the previous 
literature on in-group favoring behavior also explains the success of the crowdfunding 
project. Crowdfunding platforms are unique in that donors can choose between an 
anonymous and public donation, and if they choose the former, their name and contribution 
are only known to beneficiaries; their personal information is hidden from visitors of the 
platforms and other donors. Behind the success of the crowdfunding project, I witnessed a 
striking phenomenon; many people chose to make an anonymous donation. Previous studies 
also documented such behavior; Peacey and Sanders (2013) reported that 12% of 73,584 
donations done on behalf of people running in the London Marathon via the Virgin Money 
Giving website were anonymous. Raihani (2014) found that roughly 5% of 3,945 donations 
anonymously donated on an online fundraising website. Moreover, Sisco and Weber (2019) 
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collected records of actual contribution to more than 9000 projects from roughly 558,000 
individuals on the GoFundMe. They discovered that 21% of the donation ($10,247,209) was 
made anonymously. Despite the variation in the proportion of anonymous donation which 
could be due to differences in sample sizes, it is evident that a sizeable number of individuals 
do opt for anonymous giving – Why do they prefer to hide their altruistic acts from a broad 
audience?  
Evolutionary perspectives have prolificated studies concerning why individuals display 
costly other-benefitting behavior, and they have highlighted the value of public actions, i.e., 
signals. Evolutionary biologists and psychologists have collated various theories such as 
indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 
1998, 2005) and the costly signaling theory (Gintis et al., 2001; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). 
While these theories have different focuses, they converge on the idea that costly acts should 
be public to be beneficial for actors; completely anonymous behavior does not invite indirect 
reciprocity nor signal anything. In line with the theories, numerous empirical studies 
demonstrated that prosociality is conditional to various reputational cues (Barclay, 2004; 
Barclay & Willer, 2007; Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Campbell & Slack, 2006; Feinberg et 
al., 2014; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2014; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Milinski et al., 2002; 
Piazza & Bering, 2008; Semmann et al., 2004; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010, 2013;  Van Vugt 
et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2015, 2016b), indicating that publicity of their behavior increases 
prosocial behavior. Furthermore, preceding research has also shown that public prosocial 
behavior, results in receiving a favorable treatment (Barclay, 2004; Sylwester & Roberts, 
2010; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) and signaling positive traits (Barclay, 2006; Barclay & 
Willer, 2007; Price, 2003; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991; also see Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016 
that did not earn statistical support), suggesting public altruism has net benefits. Overall, 
these findings suggest that individuals would normally favor public giving over anonymous 
giving (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004). Therefore, existing theories, such as indirect reciprocity, 
do not offer frameworks to understand the preference for anonymous giving. 
It is a theoretical conundrum as to why individuals prefer not to have a broad audience 
know about their donation. Although previous studies explained why individuals 
anonymously display prosocial behavior (e.g., Hackel et al., 2017),  such preference for 
anonymous giving has not been directly studied. In the following, I discuss potential 
explanations for the preference and argue that costly anonymous behavior would have its 
functions and values.    
First, the amount of donation relative to other donors should influence the decision as to 
whether to make donations public or anonymous. Relevant underpinnings for the prediction 
are derived from competitive altruism (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Glazer & Konrad, 1996; 
Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Roberts, 1998; Van Vugt et al., 2012). The theory provides an 
explanation for the evolution of cooperation, assuming that there are individual differences in 
altruism, and there is competition in selecting partners and forming coalitions. According to 
the theory, individuals should compete to be generous in order to increase mating and 
coalition opportunities. Experimental studies found support for the theory, demonstrating that 
public signals of cooperation deliver cooperative intent and trustworthiness (Barclay, 2004; 
Barclay & Willer, 2007) and those who gave more in a public goods game were more likely 
to be chosen as a partner (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). 
Furthermore, Kraft-Todd and Rand (2019) found that heroic actions were perceived as rare 
and costly to actors. Peacey and Sanders (2013) also found that extremely large donations 
were likely to be anonymous. Given that the race to be altruistic exists, when one knows their 
contribution would be much smaller than that of other individuals, they would opt out for 
anonymous contribution; disclosing this would signal unfavorable quality of them relative to 
others, and consequently, it would disadvantage them in the race. Thus, past research has 
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suggested that public and enormous contribution would have various net benefits, and 
individuals whose contribution is known to be relatively small would opt for anonymous 
giving.   
It might seem to suggest that individuals would publicly donate a large amount of 
money, but previous studies have implied that it is not that simple; observers of such public 
signals do not always perceive the gesture as conveying generosity, rather they see it as a 
self-serving strategic act (Berman et al., 2015; Gambetta & Przepiorka, 2014; Hoffman et al., 
2015). Moreover, Rand and Epstein (2014) revealed that individuals attributed heroic acts to 
intuitive decision-making, rather than thoughtful, strategic decision making. Thus, 
individuals are not only sensitive to the quantity of altruistic behavior but also the motivation 
behind it. It would be of vital importance in evaluating prosocial acts whether actors 
themselves choose to make it public or not; when people know that somebody arbitrarily 
makes their altruistic act public, observers of the action might not positively evaluate it. From 
the recipient’s perspective, it would be particularly important as anonymous donation might 
partial out the self-serving motives of donors. Consistently with this, Raihani (2014) revealed 
that donors tended to choose anonymous contributions when making extremely low and high 
donations. Furthermore, social psychological work has added empirical support for the 
preference for anonymous giving in a different light. It has found that individuals evaluate 
others bases on whether their behavior is normative or not (Marques et al., 2001; Parks & 
Stone, 2010). Parks and Stone. (2010), for example, found that people the least wanted a 
selfless actor in public goods games to remain in the group. They further conducted a 
thematic analysis on reasons behind the unpopularity of altruists and revealed that individuals 
felt that the presence of such selfless persons made them look bad, and the selfless seemed to 
deviate from the behavioral norm of the group. Their finding has aided the argument that 
public mass donation might be rather harmful to donors.   
 Overall, while the competitive altruism perspective generally argues that the more 
contribution one can publicly make, the more likely it is that they are better off, there has 
been ample evidence that public signals might backfire. Past research collectively suggested 
that when the amount of donation deviates from the central tendency towards either the low 
or high end, a public donation will yield negative consequences.  
The second explanation is pertinent to the role of prosocial behavior in signaling the 
relationship between a recipient and a donor. Bird et al. (2018) suggested that prosocial 
signals not only form potential coalitions but also maintain existing cooperative relationships 
with others. They have posited that a subtle dyadic interpersonal signal serves to signal the 
actors’ commitment to the relationship. Given that altruism implicates that actors are willing 
to commit to the relationship with recipients of their generosity, it can be reasonably assumed 
that interpersonal prosocial behavior would convey information about the relationship 
between a recipient and a donor to observers; I contend that public interpersonal prosocial 
behavior indicates the alliance between the individuals, or, at least, the intension of a donor to 
form a coalition. This becomes extremely important when individuals do not want to conceal 
the relationship with the recipient but still would like to contribute. 
There is a compelling example that individuals are aware that altruistic acts reveal the 
relationship and they strategically anonymize it; in January 2020, Massachusetts Institution of 
Technology released the report that faculty members had been receiving donations from 
Jeffery Epstein who was convicted of procuring an underage girl for prostitution (Braceras et 
al., 2020). They knew that the fact they had received money from him would damage their 
reputation and decided to record it as anonymous purposefully. Aside from this extreme 
example, the crowdfunding project that I referred to earlier can also be an example. Public 
contribution to the project unquestionably divulges the political affiliation and commitment 
of donors, and the reveal might disadvantage them, especially in politically diverse places. 
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Specifically, the overt connection to the recipient (i.e., the Republican party) would 
negatively affect how liberals perceive them. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that individuals would care how in-group members 
see them, not out-group members or strangers (Kiyonari et al., 2000; Mifune et al., 2010; 
Yamagishi et al., 1999), suggesting that conservatives would not think about how liberals 
would think about them. However, recent studies have collated counter-evidence that they do 
care about their reputation even when interacting with out-group members (Romano et al., 
2017; Yazdi et al., 2020). Moreover, several studies have found that individuals sometimes 
help out-group members so that the out-group has a positive image of their own group (e.g., 
Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Jongh, 2015). Thus, past studies suggest that it is 
important for individuals to maintain a positive reputation from others regardless of their 
group membership under some circumstances. Therefore, conservatives might opt for 
anonymous donation, considering how others, especially liberals, would perceive them. 
Overall, it can be postulated that individuals would avoid public contribution to an agent or a 
group when the disclosure of the relationship with them might be negatively perceived by 
others.  
I have discussed two likely accounts for the preference for anonymous giving, proposing 
that anonymous giving could be a means for reputation management. The first explanation, 
the potential influence of the relative amount of contribution, has already gained preliminary 
evidence from Raihani (2014) that found that extremely low and high donations were more 
likely to be anonymous compared to mid-range donations. However, the motivation behind 
the observed tendency has not been examined yet. Future experimental work should, thus, 
further investigate how individuals perceive altruism deviating from norms and whether the 
anonymization of prosocial acts is, in fact, linked to the meta-perception of public altruistic 
behavior. The second explanation was based on the assumption that public prosocial behavior 
reveals the coalition between a donor and recipient, and individuals strategically hide it. It is, 
however, challenging to conduct an experiment in which characteristics of a recipient is 
manipulated (e.g., a villain vs. a hero), as it is unlikely that individuals would display 
prosocial behavior towards a person or group with a negative image in the first place. 
Alternatively, I suggest that future studies focus on whether individuals would like to 
anonymously or publicly contribute to an in-group, manipulating images of the group 
(positively vs. negatively perceived in-group; e.g., see Hopkins et al., 2007; Owuamalam & 
Zagefka, 2011). This would establish a similar context to the crowdfunding project and 
would allow us to directly test the hypothesis that individuals anonymize prosocial behavior 
towards an in-group with negative images in order to conceal the affiliation with it. Lastly, I 
would like to note that there are, of course, other miscellaneous factors potentially 
underpinning the tendency, such as a default choice (Arshad et al., 2019; Sunstein, 2017) and 
individual differences in prosocial tendencies (e.g., social value orientation; McClintock & 
Allison, 1989). Thus, there would be diverse, relevant paths for future studies to elucidate 
psychological or evolutionary mechanisms behind the tendency to opt-out for anonymous 
giving.  
In conclusion, past studies have not yet endeavored to delineate why individuals 
sometimes tend to conceal their altruistic acts from the broad audience, and the value and 
function of such anonymous giving have been understudied. Despite the lack of research, past 
studies have implied that individuals might deliberately anonymize their prosocial acts from 
third parties. In other words, they might arbitrarily control the dissemination of information 
signaled by their behavior – I would call it selective signaling. This notion challenges the 
predominant view that anonymous giving is a pure reflection of selfless intents 
(psychological altruism; Batson, 1991; Sisco & Weber, 2019). Thus, I believe that future 
research should further delve into the deliberate anonymization of prosocial behavior. The 
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elucidation of the preference for anonymous giving would substantially improve the current 
understanding of anonymous altruistic actions.  
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